Auto_DLL_Hijack_Suite_GUI

 This project provides a suite of two Python-based GUI tools designed to automate and streamline the process of discovering and testing potential DLL hijacking vulnerabilities in Windows applications.

Overview

This project provides a suite of two Python-based GUI tools designed to automate and streamline the process of discovering and testing potential DLL hijacking vulnerabilities in Windows applications. It leverages Sysinternals Process Monitor (Procmon) for data collection and provides a framework for testing identified hijack points with user-selected payloads.

Many applications attempt to load Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) without specifying a full path. If these DLLs are not found in standard locations, an attacker might be able to place a malicious DLL with the same name in a location that the application searches earlier (e.g., the application’s own directory if it has weak permissions), leading to the malicious DLL being loaded and executed. Manually identifying all such “NAME NOT FOUND” DLLs and testing each one for hijackability can be a tedious and time-consuming process. This suite aims to automate these steps.

The Suite Consists of Two Main Tools:

Procmon Capture GUI (ProcmonAutoCaptureGUI.exe):

• Automates the configuration and execution of Process Monitor (Procmon) to capture file system events from a target application.
• Filters Procmon output to identify DLLs that the target application attempts to load but result in a “NAME NOT FOUND” status.
• Saves these potential hijack candidates (DLL names and paths) into a structured CSV file (e.g., output.csv).

Hijack Exploiter GUI (DLLHijackExploiterGUI.exe):

• Parses the CSV file generated by the Procmon Capture GUI.
• Allows the user to select one or more custom payload DLLs.
• Systematically attempts to place the selected payload (renamed to the missing DLL’s name) into the identified directories.
• Launches the target application to trigger the potential hijack.
• Includes features for managing test execution, such as pausing, resuming, and stopping.

Problem Solved

• This suite addresses the following challenges in DLL hijacking vulnerability research:
• Time-Consuming Manual Analysis: Manually running Procmon, sifting through thousands of events, and identifying all “NAME NOT FOUND” DLLs for a target application is laborious.
• Inefficient Testing: Manually copying, renaming, and testing multiple payloads against numerous potential hijack locations is error-prone and slow.
• Missed Opportunities: Testers might focus only on a few obvious “NAME NOT FOUND” DLLs, potentially missing less common but still exploitable ones. This tool encourages testing a broader set of candidates.
• Privilege Context: Helps differentiate between vulnerabilities exploitable by a normal user (if they have write access to a directory in the DLL search path) versus those requiring administrative privileges.

How to Use

Part 1: Data Collection (ProcmonAutoCaptureGUI.exe)

• Run the ProcmonAutoCaptureGUI.exe.
• Use the GUI to browse for the target executable you want to analyze.
• Set the desired capture duration.
• Specify the output CSV filename (default: output.csv).
• Click “Start Procmon Capture & Generate CSV”.
• The script will run Procmon, launch your target app, collect data, filter it, and save the results to the specified CSV file.

Part 2: Exploitation Testing (DLLHijackExploiterGUI.exe)

• Ensure your custom payload DLLs (e.g., calcsigned.dll, notepad.dll) are in a Payloads subdirectory next to HijackExploiterGUI.py.
• Run the DLLHijackExploiterGUI.exe.
• Select verbosity and inter-DLL delay.
• Browse for the output.csv (or custom named CSV) generated in Part 1.
• Browse for the same target executable analyzed in Part 1.
• Select one or more payloads from the list.
• If running as Admin, confirm if you wish to proceed with admin-level tests.
• Click “Start Exploitation”.
• Monitor the GUI log and any payload actions (e.g., calc/notepad appearing).
• Use “Pause”/”Resume” and “Stop” as needed.
• Check dll_hijack_gui_log.txt for detailed logs.

Download:https://github.com/crazywifi/Auto_DLL_Hijack_Suite_GUI/tree/main

Disclaimer

This tool is intended for security research, penetration testing, and educational purposes only. Use it responsibly and only on systems you have explicit permission to test. The creator is not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this tool. Always ensure your payload DLLs are safe and intended for testing environments.

Antivirus / Windows Defender Warnings (False Positives)

Please be aware: Due to the nature of this tool and the actions it performs, it is highly likely that Windows Defender or other antivirus/EDR solutions will flag the compiled executables (or even the Python scripts) as potentially malicious (e.g., Trojan, PUA — Potentially Unwanted Application, Generic Malware).

Why does this happen?

• Antivirus software uses various detection methods, including:
• Heuristics: The tool performs actions that, while legitimate for security testing and research in this context, are also common in actual malware:
• Launching Processes: It programmatically starts Procmon64.exe and the target application being tested using subprocess.
• Process Inspection: It uses libraries like psutil to list loaded DLLs in other processes and check parent-child relationships.
• File Manipulation: It copies payload DLLs into application directories and later removes them (shutil, os.remove).
• Potentially Suspicious Payloads: If using payloads that perform network callbacks (curl, reverse shells) or modify the system significantly, these actions themselves are inherently suspicious.
• Packed Executables (if using — onefile with PyInstaller): Single-file executables created by PyInstaller work by unpacking themselves into a temporary location before running. This technique is also used by malware packers to hide malicious code, making AV engines suspicious of any such packer behavior. (Note: Even — onedir mode might trigger flags due to the bundled Python components or script behavior).
• Lack of Code Signing: The executables are not digitally signed by a trusted Certificate Authority. Unsigned executables originating from the internet or unofficial sources are treated with higher suspicion by security software.
• Low Reputation: As a specialized tool, it likely doesn’t have the widespread use and established reputation that allows AVs to trust it automatically.

What to do if it’s flagged:

• Verify the Source: Ensure you downloaded the code/executable directly from this official GitHub repository or built it yourself from the source code provided here. Do not run executables from untrusted sources.
• Submit as False Positive: If you believe the detection is incorrect, please submit the flagged file to your antivirus vendor for analysis (e.g., Microsoft Defender File Submission portal). This helps improve their detection accuracy.